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Abstract
In this paper we seek to explain the causes and consequences of Northern penetration in Southern
subsistence markets in order to reach the countless masses at the Bottom of the (Income)
Pyramid. To this end we formulate a One-North-Many-Souths model, inspired by the Krugman
(1979) North-South model. In our model, Southern countries are differentiated with respect to
population size, but also the degree of internal connectedness as a proxy for the cost involved in
reaching the local subsistence market. Northern subsistence goods production in Southern
countries takes place under increasing returns to scale, why local production of subsistence goods
takes place under constant returns to scale. Using this set-up, we show what kind of Southern
countries would be penetrated first, and under which conditions this would happen. From the
point of view of Northern producers, Southern countries can be divided into three classes: the
broad  class  of  partner-  and  non  partner  countries,  and  within  the  class  of  partner  countries,  the
sub-classes  of  small  and  large  partners.  In  this  context,  small  partners  are  so  small,  that  all  of
local subsistence production is taken over by the North, while in large countries part of
subsistence consumption must still be met out of local subsistence production. The main insights
coming from numerical simulations with the model are that Northern penetration on Southern
markets releases (labor) resources that can then be used for producing tradable luxury goods. This
has a negative terms of trade effect for the South, but a positive income effect, while, moreover,
the latter effect tends to outweigh the former. In addition, small partner countries generally stand
to gain more from Northern penetration than large countries, as in small partner countries
relatively more resources would be released when shifting production of subsistence goods from
local to Northern technologies. Using numerical simulations in which we increase the rate of
imitation, we show that this leads to higher terms of trade for the South, and consequently, a
higher penetration of the North in Southern countries with respect to subsistence production. The
reason is that the opportunity cost of using Northern labor in Northern luxury goods production
falls, and consequently more Northern labor is allocated to its alternative use of managing
subsistence goods production in Southern countries. Thus we are able to ‘explain’ the recent
penetration of Northern firms in subsistence goods production in countries like India and China
(which have become increasingly important as manufacturing trading partners), as the latter
countries are both large in population terms as well as relatively well connected.
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51. Introduction
Much of the wealth in the world is concentrated in the hands of relatively few people.
Most of these people are situated in the Western world, i.e. the United States and Europe,
whereas poverty rules in large parts of Africa, Asia and South America. From a demand
point of view, the structure of the world market resembles a pyramid, with a numerically
small but rich part at the top and a much larger but poor part at the bottom. Multinational
corporations  have  routinely  ignored  the  bottom of  the  pyramid (henceforth  BOP).  To  some
extent this is because the margins on products sold there are necessarily small, but it is also
because the products affordable by poor buyers are necessarily low-cost products. Indeed,
the cost-price of a product should be just about enough to cover the cost of embedding its
core functional characteristics (i.e. its ‘essence’) into the product, but not enough to
differentiate it from otherwise similar products through carefully designed marketing
campaigns.1 Indeed, many of the high-tech products widely used in Western societies these
days thrive on fleeting product fads. Users of mobile phones, games consoles, cars, kitchen
appliances and even holidays put a high premium on variety and temporary exclusivity and
suppliers happily oblige by providing the variety one is looking for in the product market
niches created by their own marketing activities.
The  poor  of  the  world,  in  contrast,  are  striving  to  expand  their  consumption  goods
spectrum largely to cover their basic needs more completely. Because of their low income,
they often fall short of covering the complete basic needs spectrum. However, it may well be
possible to service the basic needs of the poor more completely by selling products that have
been stripped down to the bare functional essentials at prices that enable (nearly) everyone to
obtain these products. In the latter case volumes sold could be practically infinitely high and
even with very small but still positive margins, profits are potentially very large indeed. So, if
products,  but  also  the  way  in  which  products  are  brought  to  the  local  market,  could  be
geared more directly to the needs of the people at the bottom of the income pyramid, both
consumers and producers could gain.
1 Prahalad and Hammond claim that … “It is hard to argue that the wealth of technology and talent
within leading multinationals is better allocated to producing incremental variations of exisiting
products  than  to  addressing  the  real  needs-  and  real  opportunities-  at  the  bottom  of  the  pyramid.”
(Prahalad and Hammond (2002, p.11)). On this matter, see also Prahalad (2006).
6The reason why we underline the importance of the way in which products are brought
to the local market is that doing so is intrinsically more difficult in BOP societies than in
Western societies. The latter societies are densely connected through both physical
infrastructure like (rail-) roads, airlines and shipping networks, and a variety of information
and communication channels. In BOP societies, by contrast, such connections are often sorely
lacking. The lack of true mass media and other means of long-distance communication make
it difficult to raise awareness for the existence of a product, since marketing campaigns using
television broadcasts or newspapers are not an option. Instead, advertisement needs to be
explicitly geared towards local, small shop suppliers, cf. Prahalad (2006). The same applies to
actually making the product available. Somewhat perversely, the sparsely connected BOP
societies often bear higher transportation costs than is typically the case in Western societies,
while these same societies can ill afford to pay these higher costs.
To illustrate the working of the main principles involved, we construct a model that
distinguishes between a rich North and a poor South, in the tradition of Krugman (1979), but
also Helpman (1993) and Grossman and Helpman (1991) and many others since, cf. Chui c.s.
(2002) for an overview. Unlike Krugman (1979), in our model the South consists of many
countries that differ both in population size and in ‘connectedness’, a catch-all that represents
the cost of reaching the market and can stand for both the density of the transportation
network as well as those used for (tele-) communication. Again unlike Krugman (1979), we
subdivide the goods produced into two main groups, one homogeneous subsistence good
and a multitude of luxury goods. Furthermore, we will make the assumption that
consumption of the subsistence good at the subsistence level generates a zero level of utility,
while subsistence good consumption over and above subsistence level yields no additional
utility. For luxury goods we assume that any positive level of consumption generates positive
utility in a Love of Variety way (cf. Krugman (1979)). This implies that the relative demand
for  goods  and services  in  rich  countries  will  be  tilted  towards  luxury  goods,  and the  other
way around in poor countries, ceteris paribus. The demand structure for a Southern country
is highlighted in Figure 1 below. It resembles a structure with different income-elasticities for
subsistence and luxury goods as implied by the use of non-homothetic utility functions as in
Matsuyama (2000), for example. However, in our case, we can keep the model relatively
simple by assuming two modes of operandi for demand: the case where actual income is
7below subsistence income, and no luxury goods will be demanded, and the other case in
which free disposable income (the excess of actual income over subsistence income) is spent
on luxury goods.
In this Figure, the utility function which is behind the demand structure is represented
as a set of communicating vessels. The liquid represents the flow of total consumption
expenditures. The vessel at the left hand side communicates with the other vessels through a
one-way-valve2 in the middle of the wall that separates the subsistence vessel from the LOV-
vessels, while the LOV-vessels in turn communicate at the bottom.  Thus they mimic Love of
Variety, as expenditures on luxury goods automatically get spread over all luxury goods
available. It should be noted that the ordering between subsistence expenditures and luxury
goods expenditures is lexicographical, since Love of Variety-based utility can only be
generated if the subsistence good is consumed at subsistence level.
Figure 1. Southern subsistence and luxury goods expenditures
If we normalize the width of the subsistence level vessel to 1, the subsistence level
consumption expenditures are given by the height of the valve. The latter is determined by
the consumer price of the subsistence good. So, lowering prices means that for the same level
2 The valve should actually be a one-way-pump if the fluid level within the LOV vessels exceeds the
level in the subsistence vessel.
Subsistence expenditures LOV luxury expenditures
8of nominal income, i.e. for the same contents of the bucket, more of that income will overflow
into the luxury goods section.
It follows immediately from the Figure that the demand for Northern products may
increase via three different channels:
1. a higher income in the South, leading to more ‘spill-overs’ into the luxury vessels;
2. reduced vessel height (lower price) in the group of subsistence goods;
3. Northern entry in Southern subsistence goods production.
The first two channels are largely out of the control of individual Northern firms, but the
third one is not. In order to find out why and in which type of Southern countries Northern
firms would want to enter the market for subsistence goods, we develop a simple theoretical
model and look at the plausibility of the predictions that this model generates regarding
Northern activity on Southern BOP markets.
The paper is further organized as follows. In section 2 we describe the structure of the
model, while section 3 contains the results of several numerical simulations, a base run and
some experiments regarding the sensitivity of the outcomes to different parameter values. In
section 4 we provide some concluding remarks.
2. The Model
2.1 General Setting
In order to keep the model as simple as possible, we use the Krugman (1979) model as a
template to which we add the production of subsistence goods as well as the demand for
those goods. The demand and supply of luxury goods is modeled using essentially the same
structure as in Krugman. To simplify matters somewhat, we will assume that the North does
not demand any subsistence goods.
The general subsistence goods production setting is that of many Southern local
producers who are in perfect competition with each other. Southern producers produce
locally, i.e. they do not centralize production, whereas Northern producers do, and can thus
realize economies of scale due to the concentration of production and the sharing of high-
skilled management resources. The downside of this centralized mode of production are the
9distribution and marketing costs that must be incurred to reach the overall market, which is
spread out over the entire country. We only implement economies of scale in subsistence
goods production by the North,  as we would like to follow Krugman as closely as possible
with respect to the rest of the model.
Contrary to Krugman, we assume that labour is heterogeneous, i.e. the North has a
relatively abundant supply of high-skilled labour, while the South is relatively low-skill
abundant. In fact, we make the grossly simplifying assumption that all labour in the North is
high-skilled, and all labour in the South is low-skilled.
As in Krugman (1979), the North produces ‘new’ luxury goods using high-skilled labor,
while the South may use low-skilled labour to produce either subsistence goods or ‘old’
luxury goods, after the luxury goods production technology has matured enough so that it
can be used in the South using just low-skilled labour.
As stated above, with respect to the production of subsistence goods, we assume that the
South’s traditional mode of subsistence goods production is decentralized under conditions
of perfect competition. However, the North can also produce subsistence goods within the
South. It even outperforms the South in certain circumstances as it is able to produce under
conditions of increasing returns to scale by centralizing production, at the expense of higher
distribution and marketing costs. The economies of scale are linked to the use of high-skilled
management resources that need to be ‘imported’ from the North, and that have alternative
uses there (particularly the production of ‘new’ luxury goods). Following Krugman again, we
use labor as the only factor of production, while assuming that the productivity of production
labor is constant.
Thus we arrive at a minimum configuration model with two uses for Northern labour
(i.e. the production of ‘new’ luxury goods and the generation of ‘management’ services in the
South), whereas Southern labour has three uses: the production of subsistence goods using
local or Northern production technologies, and the production of ‘old’ luxury goods.
In the remainder of this section we cover the production and distribution of subsistence
goods in the South in somewhat greater detail, as the cost of marketing and distribution is of
particular importance for the development of BOP markets Prahalad (2006). Then we show
how these distribution and marketing costs in combination with the idea of fixed
management costs leads to an optimum serviceable subsistence goods market-size from the
10
point of view of Northern firms, which sometimes would want to take over all of the local
market, and sometimes just the most densely connected part of that market, while leaving the
rest of the market to local subsistence goods producers.
We show that when Southern countries differ with respect to such characteristics as
population density, infrastructure per head, technological ‘backwardness’, income per head,
and so on, we can define a rule that separates Southern countries into two sets: those that
would be selected as potential Northern partners in subsistence goods production and a set
of countries that would be left on their own by Northern firms.
2.2 Innovation and Imitation
As regards innovation and imitation in luxury goods, we use the same assumptions as in
Krugman (1979). This implies that the total number of luxury good varieties, further called A,
will grow at an exogenously given rate of innovation mˆ . Each moment in time, a fraction k
of all varieties not yet imitated will indeed be imitated. This implies that B, being the total
number of varieties imitated by the South, will grow at a rate VVk /)1(ˆ -×=B  where
AB /=V . The steady state value of V , i.e. V , is obtained by requiring that
)/(0/)1(ˆˆˆ mkkVmVVkV +=Þ=--×=-= AB .
2.3 The Demand for Luxury Goods
In order to keep the model as simple as possible, we ignore subsistence goods demand
by the North, as subsistence consumption in the North is generally a negligible part of total
consumption. In the South this may be totally different, so we will explicitly cover Southern
subsistence goods demand. In that context, it should be noted that the role of subsistence
goods in generating utility is totally different from luxury goods. As stated before, we assume
that consumers in the South use their income first to fulfill their subsistence needs, and then
spend the remainder of their income - if there is any - on luxury goods. Thus, for the South
the budget spent on luxury goods is equal to total labor income less expenditures on
subsistence goods, while the North spends all its income on luxury goods.
With regard to luxury goods, we assume that their demand follows from a Love of
Variety utility function as in Krugman (1979) again. But in addition to the Krugman
specification, we allow for decreasing returns to variety: luxury good varieties that are
11
invented later may not contribute as much to utility as earlier inventions. Old luxury goods
are produced under perfectly competitive conditions, as every Southern country has access to
the corresponding ‘matured’ technologies. In the North, however, ‘new’ luxury goods are
produced under imperfectly competitive conditions, as Northern producers have temporary
monopoly rights on the production of a particular variety of luxury goods, again as in
Krugman (1979). These temporary monopoly rights on new luxury goods give rise to wage
differentials between the North and the South.
Let all luxury goods be indexed on the continuous range [0,A].  Let  the goods with the
lowest indices be invented first, in which case variety expansion can be thought of as a
process that leads to an increase in A over time. Let the sub-range [0,B] cover all varieties that
have matured, and that can be produced by the South. Imitation can then be thought of as a
process that increases B over time. In this setting, there are two kinds of luxury goods:
matured/old luxury goods with indices i Î [0,B] and ‘new’ luxury goods with indices
i Î (B,A].
Let us call the level of consumption per head of the i-th ‘old’ luxury good oic , and that of
the i-th ‘new’ luxury good nic .  Furthermore, let s  be the elasticity of substitution between
individual luxury goods in each person’s utility function. As in Krugman (1979), this function
is given by:
1
0
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where U represents utility per individual. The only difference with respect to Krugman’s
utility function is the presence of variety-specific distribution parameters ia  and ja , that we
have introduced in order to be able to study the consequences of the possibility of decreasing
returns to variety, i.e. decreases in the direct contribution to utility of a new variety.3
3 We  can  implement  such  a  notion  by  requiring  that 0/ <¶¶ AAa ,  i.e.  the  newer  a  variety  is,  the
smaller its contribution to utility may become. We will come back to this later.
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We can use (1) to formulate a typical utility maximization problem involving a budget
constraint with associated Lagrange multiplier l , which has the usual interpretation of the
inverse of the (minimum-) cost of one unit of utility (a ‘util’) in monetary terms:
UXXU LL //1/ =Û= ll           (2)
In equation (2), LX  is the budget that a representative consumer spends on luxury goods (we
will be using XS later on to denote consumer expenditures on subsistence goods). Using (1)
and (2), as well as the FOC’s of the utility maximization problem with respect to each single
variety, we obtain the following demand equation per variety, as well as the definition of l
in terms of the corresponding consumer prices of each variety:
( ) AiBnjBiojwithpXc ijiLji £<"=££"=××= -- ,0/ 1 ss la                       (3)
where oip  is the consumer price of the i-th ‘old’ variety, and
n
ip  is the consumer price of the i-
th ‘new’ variety. For l  we obtain the expression:
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From (4) one can see that the price of a ‘util’ is linear homogeneous in the consumer
prices of individual varieties. Equation (3), for a given value of l ,  will  function  as  the
demand constraint for the Northern suppliers of individual luxury goods varieties.4 As  we
will explain later on, prices of all ‘old’ varieties are the same, and this also holds for prices of
all ‘new’ varieties, given our assumption that the linear production technologies of luxury
goods are all the same. There may be price differences between ‘old’ and ‘new’ varieties,
though. In that case, equation (3) implies that total expenditures on luxury goods are
distributed over ‘old’ and ‘new’ varieties, as follows:
4 This  assumes that  there  are  so many varieties  already on the market  that  the impact  of  a  marginal
change in the price of an old or new variety on the average market price of a ‘util’ can be ignored, i.e.
individual suppliers of luxury goods are small relative to the entire luxury goods market.
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where X o  and X n  are the parts of the budget spent on ‘old’ and ‘new’ varieties, respectively.
From (5) it follows that we need to specify the distribution coefficients a  first  in  order  to
obtain the distribution of total luxury goods expenditures over ‘old’ and new’ varieties.
However, it is clear that the expenditure ratio will in any case depend positively on B, and
negatively on A, ceteris paribus.
To keep the utility function as tractable as possible, we specify the distribution
coefficients as an exponentially declining function of the corresponding variety index. In
particular we assume:
i
i e
×-×= gaa 0           (6)
where 10 =a , and 0³g  is a constant parameter that represents the percentage drop in the
contribution coefficient of each luxury good variety with an increase of the variety index by 1
unit. Note that setting 0=g  would yield Krugman’s symmetric case.
Before describing supply behavior in more detail, we have to look into the conditions
under which Northern producers would want to enter subsistence goods production in
Southern countries. This is the subject of the following section.
2.4 Southern Production and Distribution Characteristics
We assume that Southern producers of subsistence goods produce strictly locally and
under perfectly competitive conditions, under relatively high unit costs, and constant returns
to scale. Northern firms can outperform these local producers through lower unit variable
cost at the expense of incurring fixed management cost. This provides an incentive for the
North to centralize production in each Southern country because of economies of scale. This
drive for centralization, however, is limited by the presence of transportation and marketing
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costs. The latter depend on things like population density and the degree to which that
population is connected, both physically and ‘informationally’, to Northern subsistence
goods suppliers.
It is easy to show that the cost of reaching the population will rise more than
proportionally with the size of the population reached, if the density of that population
decreases while moving away from the population center of a country. To simplify matters,
we will assume that communication and transportation efforts will rise quadratically with the
size of the population to be reached, further called the ‘targeted population’. We furthermore
assume that the (low-skilled) labor efforts required to reach the targeted population are
proportional to total transportation and communication efforts. The size of the market that
can be serviced in a profitable way by a Northern subsistence firm is therefore determined
not just by prices and unit production costs, but also by population density and the degree to
which the population can be reached at relatively low marketing and distribution costs per
person.
2.5 Northern Subsistence Goods Production
It is assumed that for the North to enter the BOP market of a Southern country, the
North has to transfer scarce high-skilled management resources to the South, in order to
oversee the use of Northern subsistence goods production technology by Southern low-
skilled workers. For reasons of simplicity, we assume that both Northern and Southern
production technologies use only low-skilled labor. However, the Northern technology uses
less of that low-skilled labour per unit of output than the Southern technology, i.e.
NS nn ³>1 , where Sn  represents unit (low-skilled) labour requirements for the Southern
subsistence good production technology, while Nn  represents the low-skilled unit labour
requirements for the Northern technology.5
As stated above, the subsistence good is locally produced under perfectly competitive
conditions,  and it  sells  at  a  price q on the local market. In addition to this, we assume that
5 The assumption that vS<1, implies that it takes less than one low-skilled workers input to produce the
required volume of subsistence goods. Otherwise, under the utility assumptions we have made here,
the Southern countries would have nothing to trade, since all their labour would be tied up in
subsistence goods production.
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Northern and Southern subsistence goods are perfect substitutes, implying that the Southern
cost-price is also the maximum selling price of Northern subsistence goods.
In order to determine the total volume of sales of a particular subsistence good we make
the assumption that at each moment in time, the required level of consumption of a particular
subsistence  good  is  equal  to  one  unit. Under these assumptions the quantity of the
subsistence good that any Southern low-skilled worker inelastically supplying a unit of
labour and earning a wage w can  buy,  is w/q. The volume of subsistence goods that an
individual will actually buy is the minimum of w/q and 1. Consequently, S being the number
of units of the subsistence good sold to a population with size P, will be given by:
)1,min(
q
wPS ×=           (7)
Using (7), we find that the profits g  for a Northern firm producing subsistence goods
within some Southern country are given by:
NN whwP
q
wPwqg ×--×××-=
q
n
2
)1,min()(
2
        (8)
where h  is the amount of high-skilled Northern labor required in subsistence production in a
Southern country, receiving the competitive wage wN .  The  middle  part  of  equation  (8)  is  a
quadratic function in P which  serves  as  a  direct  indicator  of  the  labour  costs  involved  in
reaching a group of customers of size P (either for advertising purposes or direct distribution
purposes). These costs depend negatively on the economic “connectedness” of the country as
measured by the parameter q  and quadratically on P, as stated above. The 2 is there for
convenience sake.
Using (8), we can find the values of P and q that would maximize the gross operating
surplus of a Northern firm active on the subsistence market. With respect to q we find that
the first partial derivative of g  w.r.t. q is always positive, and hence q should be as high as
possible but low enough to capture the entire market, i.e. q should be only marginally below
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the price of local varieties of subsistence goods. Hence, we find that under perfect
competition between local producers the Northern firm would effectively set: 6
Swq n×=         (9)
Using (8) and (9), we can find the value of P that maximizes g , i.e. P*. For some
countries, this optimum value of P may be less than the entire population P , i.e. P* < P . In
other cases the size of the population will be a binding constraint on the maximization
problem and so the entire population will be served, i.e. P* = P . The latter follows
immediately from the fact that (8) defines g  as a hump-shaped function of P.  So  if  the
population is not large enough to reach the global maximum of g  then the largest value of P,
such that P £ P  will  do  the  trick,  since ¶g /¶P > 0 " P < P *. We will refer to the former
group of countries as large and the latter as small countries. In a large country, therefore a
part P - P *  will not be targeted by Northern firms, but will instead still have to be serviced
by supply coming from local Southern firms.
Using (8) and (9), we find for the large country case that:
fq ×=*P          (10)
where 0)( >-= NS nnf , i.e. j  measures the absolute difference in unit labor requirements
between local Southern production technologies and Northern subsistence goods production
technologies. It is therefore a measure of the technological advantage of the North in
subsistence goods production.
In the small country case, equation (10) implies:
fq /* PPP £Þ£         (11)
6 Note that (9) in combination with our assumption that 1<Sv  implies  that
1)1,/1min()1,/min( == Svqw .
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It should be noted that in our model set-up, we will only consider q  and P  as
parameters that may vary between countries. In that case (11) may be used to detect which
countries have combinations of q  and P  such that they can be considered to be ‘large
countries’ in our terminology. We will come back to this issue later on in more detail.
Assuming that Northern producers want to engage in the production of Northern
subsistence varieties in some Southern country only if they could make a net profit, we can
calculate the characteristics of both large and small countries for which this would be the
case, i.e. we can set g  equal to some predetermined value and obtain the combinations of P
and q  that would generate this value. The corresponding curve in the P,q -plane would be
the corresponding ‘Iso-Net-Operating-Surplus-curve’ (further called INOS-curve), as given
by the final row in Table 1. The latter Table briefly summarizes the results we have obtained
so far for both the large and the small country cases.
It follows from the results in the Table that in both the small and the large country cases
the net operating surplus will rise with f , and so does the size of the targeted market P* in
the large country case. Note too that the size of the targeted market is invariant to the
Southern wage w. In addition, a higher degree of connectedness (i.e. a higher value of q ) will
lead to a larger population being targeted and also higher profits, ceteris paribus. Lastly, for
large countries profits are independent of the actual population size.
Variable Large country case Small country case
*P q × f P
g 1
2
× w × f 2 × q - wN × h P × w × f - P
2 × w
2 × q
- wN × h
q
( )
2
2
f×
×+×
w
hwg N
( )NwhgPw
wP
×--×××
×
f2
2
Table 1. Large and small country results
As regards the INOS-curves that are given by the entries in the Table row labeled q , we
see that in the large country case, large values of wN and h  or low values of f  and w must
coincide with large values of q , as one would expect. This also holds for the small country
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case, mutatis mutandis, but in addition to this, the actual country size (in combination with the
other variables and parameters) now also matters. For very small countries an increase in
country size goes together with a fall in q , as in this case revenues rise faster than costs,
whereas further increases in country-size go together with rising values of q  since  in  this
case costs rise faster than revenues (because of decreasing population density for increasing
targeted population sizes). Note that there is a large qualitative difference between the values
of q  in the large and in the small country case. In the large country case, the population size
is no limitation on the targeted market of that country. Hence the only thing that matters in
that case is the connectedness of the country. In case of small countries, both the country-size
(i.e. population size) as well as the connectedness of the country matter. Finally, it should be
noted that a rise in g  shifts the INOS-curve upwards, so that curves further away from the
origin in the P,q -plane represent higher levels of the Net-Operating-Surplus.
The distinction between small and large countries is important, as is the distinction
between countries with respect to their “connectedness”. The reason is that the relative
demand for high-skilled labour will depend on the number of prospective partner countries,
and so will the available supply of low-skilled labour for matured luxury goods production.
Whenever a Southern country becomes a partner country, this frees up low-skilled labour
from local subsistence goods production in that Southern country (because the Northern
technology is more productive by assumption). The low-skilled labour thus released is then
available for luxury goods production, making old luxury goods less scarce in the process.
This will provide the country with more goods to trade on the world market against
Northern luxury goods. In the process, low-skilled wages are depressed somewhat, reducing
the incentive for the North to enter additional Southern subsistence markets. High-skilled
workers in the North, on the other hand, are now in higher demand, and high-skilled wages
are driven up accordingly, also somewhat reducing the incentive to enter additional Southern
subsistence goods markets.
In the next sections we will show how these mechanisms interact. To this end we will
look more closely into the heterogeneity between Southern countries, and then use that
heterogeneity to come up with aggregate world-market clearing wages for the low- and the
high-skilled, as well as their corresponding equilibrium levels of employment, including their
geographical distribution.
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2.6 Southern Heterogeneity
There are many sources of heterogeneity between Southern countries that are relevant
from the North’s point of view in choosing particular Southern countries as partners in the
local production of subsistence goods (cf. Table 1, line q ). For reasons of simplicity, however,
we consider only the parameters q  and P  to vary between Southern countries, while
assuming that the other parameters and variables are identical. With respect to technology
this is a simplifying assumption, whereas with respect to w this is implied by the previous
assumptions of identical production technologies within Southern countries and the
assumption of free trade.
 To simplify matters even further, we will assume that q  and P  are uniformly and
independently distributed on the intervals [0,qmax ] and [0,P max ] respectively. This implies
that if we would draw a plane in the P,q  dimensions, the number of countries in each point
such that max0 qq ££  and max0 PP ££  would be the same, as the frequency of any
combination of characteristics would have to be identical. For reasons of simplicity, we take
this frequency to be equal to 1 from now on.
The P,q - plane is drawn in Figure 2. All countries are within the rectangle enclosed by
the horizontal and vertical dotted lines. The upward sloping dashed line within the plane is
the asymptote of the hyperbolic function that separates partner countries from non-partner
countries in the small country case. The corresponding ‘small partner separating’ function (as
given by the INOS-curve in the small country case (see Table 1)), is labeled SPS. Points above
the SPS-curve are small partner countries, while those below the SPS curve are not.
Something similar holds for the LPS-line, that separates large partner countries in the large
country case from non partners. In accordance with (10), the upward sloping SCS-line (short
for ‘Small Country Separator’) separates small countries (above the SCS line) from large
countries (below the SCS line). Consequently, large partner countries must be both above the
LPS-line and below the SCS-line, as well as inside the dotted rectangle. The area which fits
these constraints is marked using solid dots. Small partner countries are all those countries
within the dotted rectangle which are above the SCS-line and above the SPS-line.
The precise shape of the set of partner countries is determined by the following features:
Firstly, it is easy to show that the minimum value of q  of  the  top  half  of  the  hyperbolic
function describing the SPS-curve coincides with the value of q  for the LPS-curve, as drawn
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in the Figure. Secondly, the SCS-curve intersects with this minimum. Third, the vertical
asymptote of the hyperbolic SPS-curve is exactly halfway point M and the origin. Finally, the
tangent of 1l  is twice as large as that of 0l . In short, we have that
f
l 1)1( =tg ,
)0(2)1( ll tgtg ×= , q(M) =
2 g + h × wN( )
w × f 2
,
j×
×+
=
w
whgNP
N
)(  and )(2)( NPMP ×= , where
we have used the notation )(Xq  to denote the q -coordinate of a point labeled X in Figure 2,
while )(XP  denotes the P -coordinate of such a point X.
Figure 2. Northern subsistence goods production partners
It is instructive to see what happens if in this setting the Northern wage goes up. In that
case the LPS-curve shifts upward and the hyperbolic SPS-curve shifts to the right,
compressing the set of partner countries into the top-right corner of the dotted rectangle. The
same happens for increases in h . Higher wages for high-skilled workers make for a smaller
number of Southern countries eligible for subsistence goods production partnerships. A rise
in the Southern wage, on the other hand, shifts down the LPS-curve, while moving points M
and N to the left. In addition, the SCS-curve gets flatter, and so does the upward-sloping
maxP
maxq
N
M
LPS
SPS
SCS
q
P
0l 1l
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asymptote of the SPS-curve, leading to an expansion of the set of partner countries in the
direction of the bottom-left corner of the dotted rectangle. A change in f , i.e. the productivity
difference between Northern and Southern subsistence goods production technologies, will
have qualitatively similar effects as a change in the Southern wage. Interestingly, both
‘technological backwardness’ and a relatively high wage-income in the South, make for
potentially profitable partnerships between the North and the South.
  We conclude that changes in Northern and Southern wages will change the set of
partner countries. The changes in this set will in turn have immediate consequences for the
demand for labour within Southern and Northern countries, and hence, for a given supply of
labour, for wages again. In order to see, therefore, how innovation, imitation and Southern
heterogeneity interact, we will now turn to a description of the associated demand for labour.
To this end, we must first cover the entry decisions of Northern firms in the Southern
subsistence goods markets.
2.7 Northern Entry of Southern Subsistence Goods Markets
Contrary to Krugman’s model, our set-up implies that Northern high-skilled workers
have two competing uses; they can produce varieties of ‘new’ luxury goods in the North, but
they can also engage in the management of subsistence goods production in the South. Given
the limited supply of Northern high-skilled labour, Southern subsistence goods production
by Northern firms therefore has an opportunity cost in the form of potential profits on
Northern luxury good production foregone.
In order to derive the optimal allocation of Northern high-skilled labour over these two
activities  we  define  the  profit  function  for  a  Northern  producer,  who  we  assume  is  a
monopolist both in the production of luxury goods in the North and in subsistence goods
production in the South. Thus we have for total profits iy   for the Northern producer of
variety i, and for a given Northern wage Nw , that:
ò+×-=
max
).()(
g
g
n
i
Nn
ii
i
dvvvncwpy         (12)
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In equation (12), nic  is the level of production of the i-th Northern luxury good variety.
As we assume that it takes one unit of high-skilled labor to produce one unit of the variety, it
also represents the level of employment necessary for the production of the i-th variety. The
demand for this variety is given by equation (3). Furthermore, n(v) is the number of Southern
countries with a net operating surplus exactly equal to v, while ig  is the smallest value of the
net operating surplus on subsistence goods production in some country that the i-th
Northern luxury good variety producer would want to engage in. maxg is the value of the
INOS-curve through the point ),( maxmax Pq  in Figure 2. Consequently, ò
max
).(
g
g i
dvvvn  represents
total profits from subsistence goods production by this Northern producer of variety i,
therefore. The control variables for a Northern variety producer are nip  and ig . Recalling that
the demand for the i-th Northern luxury goods variety has a constant price elasticity of
demand equal to s  (cf. equation (3)), we find that maximisation of (12) w.r.t. the control
variables then results in the following FOC’s:
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Equation (13.A) is the well-known Amoroso-Robinson pricing condition.7 It is also
consistent with the idea that the marginal profits at that price are equal to zero. Hence,
equations (13.A) and (13.B) taken together imply that, for given Northern wages, i.e. given
marginal costs, the scarce high-skilled labor resource should be distributed over Northern
luxury goods production and Southern partner country management in such a way that the
marginal profits in both cases are the same (and equal to zero).
Since all Northern luxury goods producers face the same marginal costs, they would set
the same price and would want to enter the same Southern markets. To simplify matters, we
will now assume that Northern producers divide markets among them rather than
7 Note that also in the case where this Northern producer would hold the monopoly over a portfolio of
products, (13.A)would describe the profit maximizing price for all products in that portfolio.See also
footnote 9.
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competing against each other in each individual Southern market.8 A further, non trivial,
simplification is to assume that the number of Northern suppliers remains fixed.9 A final
simplification can then be implemented by scaling the (fixed) number of Northern producers
to  1.  The  next  sections  will  now  look  into  the  closure  of  the  model  by  means  of  the
requirement of overall labour market equilibrium.
2.8 The Labour Market
It should be noted that we need to distinguish between the large and small country case
again. In the small country case, there is no local subsistence goods production in the South
by local producers. Hence, because of the productivity differences between Northern
subsistence goods production technologies and local Southern technologies, a higher
proportion of Southern workers will be available for ‘old’ luxury goods production: there will
be more ‘free’ disposable labour available, than in large countries, ceteris paribus. This
implies that small countries stand to gain more from subsistence production partnerships
with the North than large countries. For the North, the situation is the other way around,
since in large countries they are able to reach the maximum of their hump-shaped profit-
curves, whereas in small countries they can not.
In order to determine how much Northern management labour needs to be allocated to
Southern subsistence goods production, we need to calculate the area within the rectangle
defined by q max  and P max  (the dotted vertical and horizontal lines) in Figure 2 which is above
the INOS-curve. We can then obtain the proportion of that area in the total area of the
rectangle to obtain the total number of Southern subsistence goods production partner
8 In this case, profits for the average Northern producer will be higher than when all producers would
enter all markets at the same time, because of the fixed costs associated with each Northern activity in
a Southern country. For the moment, variations on this market division assumption are left for future
research.
9 This  is  a  non-trivial  assumption,  as  an  increase  in  the  number  of  varieties,  where  each  variety  is
produced/owned by a separate Northern firm, also implies, by the symmetry between Northern
producers, that the number of firms who would want to be active on Southern markets would increase
with the number of varieties. As each Northern activity in the South entails fixed costs, the expansion
of varieties in the North, would then lead to a withdrawal of Northern production activities from the
South  from  the  marginal  countries  (the  ones  ‘on  the  INOS-curve’),  simply  because  we  have  more
Northern potential suppliers for the Southern markets. Instead, we will assume that the number of
Northern producers remains fixed, and that these producers therefore each produce an expanding sub-
spectrum/portfolio of varieties, where the relative contribution of each sub-spectrum remains the
same.
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countries. The total number of management workers is then of course equal to h  times the
number of Southern partner countries.
In order to calculate the relative area enclosed by the marginal INOS-curve, we need to
distinguish between five different situations which can occur in the model, as sketched in
Figure 3. The dotted rectangle corresponds to the one present in Figure 2.  The horizontal
solid line is the LPS-curve from Figure 2, while the convex downward sloping curve that
joins the solid horizontal line is the downward sloping part of the SPS-curve from Figure 2.
The line emanating from the origin is the SCS line. Situations II and III differ in the point at
which the SCS line intersects with the vertical dotted line. In Situation II the SCS line leaves
the box at the top while in Situation III the SCS-line is flatter and therefore intersects the
vertical boundary of the box.
Figure 3. Possible INOS-curve constellations
Note that in cases I and V, there won’t be any eligible Southern subsistence goods
production partners, since partner countries must always be above the solid line and above
the SPS curve, as well as within the dotted rectangle. This implies that only the areas of the
North-East corners of the rectangles in as far as they are above the SPS-curve and the LPS-
curve are indeed partner countries. So, in order to calculate total management labour
demand, we need to be able to identify the five different cases.
Let Q be the (virtual) point of intersection of the convex SPS-curve with the horizontal
dotted curve. Further, let M be the point where the convex curve joins the solid horizontal (cf.
Figure 2 again) and let T be the point of intersection of the SCS curve with the horizontal line
at q max . Case I will now obviously be identifiable by the requirement that the horizontal LPS-
curve lies above maxq .  In order to identify case V,  we must have max)( PQP ³ . For case IV
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point M must be to the right of the dotted vertical and point Q must be to the left of that
vertical, i.e. max)( PQP <  and P (M) ³ P max . Cases II and III share the requirements that
max)( PQP <  and P (M) < P max  and differ only in the value of P (T) .  For Case II we require
that P (T) < P max , while P (T) ³ P max  holds in Case III.10
In order to see how exactly the supply of low-skilled labour for old luxury goods
production can be determined, one is referred to the appendix, which highlights the
principles involved in more detail than above. The appendix also shows how the number of
partner countries and hence the distribution of high-skilled labour over its two uses can be
determined. Finally, the appendix shows how aggregate Northern profits from subsistence
goods production can be obtained.
2.9 Model Closure
In principle, the model is now fully specified, except for the choice of the numeraire,
which we take to be the Southern wage. The Northern wage can then be determined by
requiring equilibrium on the labor market.
The Northern wage can be calculated by considering that the demand for labor in the
South for its different uses can be determined, for a given Northern wage, as the latter, in
combination with the model-parameters defines the various separation curves, and hence the
actual case of the five cases mentioned above that will apply for that given wage rate.
Whether a country is a small or a large partner or no partner at all, is directly relevant,
because in the no partner case, all subsistence goods need to be produced using local
technologies. In the large partner case, only a part of the population needs to produce
subsistence goods using local technologies, while in the small country case, subsistence goods
are produced using the Northern technology only. This has immediate consequences for the
level of supply of old luxury goods in those countries. However, the use of Northern
production  technologies  in  the  South  also  determines  how  much  of  the  total  supply  of
Northern labor will be available for the production of Northern luxury goods in the North.
10 We  can  infer  from  the  last  row  in  Table  1,  what  these  identification  requirements  imply  for  the
parameter  and  variable  constellations  (particularly  with  regard  to  Northern  and  Southern  wages)  of
our model.
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For, a rise in Northern wages, for example, will make for a decrease in the number of
Southern partner countries, and hence for a higher level of Northern luxury goods supply.
Generally speaking, old luxury goods supply, but also subsistence goods supply using
either local or Northern technologies for the South taken as a whole, can be obtained by
means of direct integration over these concepts, taking the division of the South into large-,
small- and no partner countries into account, as described for the 5 cases above. Looking at
these cases more closely, we find that a lower Northern (relative) wage would move the LPS-
curve down, whereas the vertical asymptote through point N in Figure 2 would move to the
left, creating more Southern partners in the process, giving rise to a larger relative supply of
Southern luxury goods (and consequently a lower relative supply of Northern luxury goods),
ceteris paribus. Given the mark-up pricing relevant in case of luxury goods, a lower Northern
relative wage would also lower Northern relative prices, and hence increase the relative
demand for Northern luxury goods again. We thus have a relative demand curve for
Northern goods (and high-skilled production labor) that is downward-sloping in relative
Northern wages, and a Northern relative  supply curve of Northern luxury goods (and high-
skilled production labor) that is upward-sloping in relative Northern wages. The equilibrium
wage rate is then defined as the point of intersection of the relative labor demand and supply
curves.
3 Some Simulation Experiments
3.1 The Base Run
The only true state variables in the model are the number of old and new luxury goods,
which change over time due to innovation and imitation. Changes in the relative sizes of
these state variables drive the rest of the model, as in the original Krugman model. For
example, a rise in the ratio B/A, increases the relative importance of old luxury goods in the
generation of utility. For a given supply of Southern labor, this will decrease the supply per
old luxury good variety and hence raise the price level of old luxury goods relative to new
luxury goods. If the B/A ratio does not change, the relative scarcity of new versus old luxury
goods remains unchanged as well, and so relative prices remain the same, as will the other
model variables. This implies that the most interesting plots we may obtain using the model,
are those coming from experiments that change the scarcity of luxury products, either
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through changes in the rate of innovation m  (or the rate of imitation k ) or through changes
in the direct contribution of individual luxury goods to utility (changes in )g .  For the other
experiments we have in mind, we will only present the percentage (point) deviations from
the base-run, which are constant in the absence of transitional dynamics as indicated above.
In order to obtain the base run, we have used the parameter values given in Table 2.
Several things should be noted about this particular constellation. Firstly, the Northern
production technology for subsistence goods is more efficient by a factor of three compared
to the decentralized mode of production used in the South. Secondly, the Southern
population is larger than that of the North (1.5 as opposed to 1). Third, the demand for luxury
goods is fairly price-elastic. Fourth, the North is a very productive innovator, while the South
performs less well in imitating, in relative terms at least. Because of this, the North produces
a much wider relative spectrum of luxury goods in equilibrium than the South
( 5/4)/(1/)( =+-=- mkkABA ).11
Table 2. Base Run Parameter Values
3.2 Experimental Outcomes
To illustrate the working of the model and the evolution of the variables of interest over
time, we will first solve the model numerically for a baseline combination of parameters. We
11 See  section  2.2.  It  should  be  noted  that  the  experimental  outcomes  in  the  following  section  are
obtained for initial values of the state variables that are consistent with their steady state ratio. From
section  2.2,  it  follows  immediately  that  the  steady  state  ratio  of  the  number  of  luxury  products
produced by the North and the number of luxury products produced by the South is equal to the ratio
of the rate of innovation m  and the rate of imitation k .  With a value of B0=1, we have therefore  set
5/)( 0000 ==>×=- AABA km .
Parameter Value Parameter Value Parameter Value
q max 3 v S 0.75 k 0.025
P max 1 vN 0.25 m 0.1
w 1 P North 1 A0 5
h 0.05 s 4 B0 1
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will then run some additional simulations for a period of 10 ‘years’ in a row, for several
alternative parameterizations and compare the results to the base run. The various
experiments are listed in Table 3.
Exp. Nr. Description Parameter Base Value Exp. Value
1 Productivity Southern subs. techn. +10% Sv 0.75 0.675
2 Productivity Northern subs. techn. +10% Nv 0.25 0.225
3 Rate of innovation + 10 % m 0.1 0.11
4 Rate of imitation + 10 % k 0.025 0.0275
5 Southern Population +10% maxP 1.0 1.1
6 Northern Population +10% NorthP 1.0 1.1
7 Decreasing Returns  to Variety g 0.00 0.01
Table 3. Partial Parameter Changes by Experiment
The outcomes of the experiments are listed in Table 4, except for the ones that influence
the state variables directly (Experiments 3 & 4) and the one that influences the valuation of
variety in the decreasing returns to variety experiment (Experiment 6). For these experiments,
we will show the deviations with respect to the base run in the form of a number of plots. For
the other experiments, those same deviations are listed in Table 4.
The Table and the plots show 16 variables, see the first column of Table 4, by means of
which we sketch the events taking place. Variables 1-3 are the Southern employment shares
in local subsistence goods production, Northern subsistence goods production and ‘old’
luxury goods production. Variable 4 denotes the absolute number of Southern partner
countries, while variables 5-7 are the absolute figures for Northern profits from basic goods
production  and  from  new  luxury  goods  production,  as  well  as  total  profits  for  the  North.
Variable 8 denotes the share of basic goods profits for the North in total Northern profits,
while variable 9 denotes the profit share of the North in Northern free disposable income.
Variable 10 measures the ratio of free disposable income in the North and in the South (as
stated before, free disposable income in the South equals gross income less expenditures on
subsistence goods). Variable 11 provides the terms of trade, i.e. the price ratio of Northern
and Southern luxury goods. Variables 12 and 13 measures the utility that the North and the
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South derive from consuming both old and new luxury goods, while variable 14 measures
the ratio of Northern and Southern utility. It should be noted that, because of the linear
homogeneity of the utility function in consumption levels, the utility ratio is exactly equal to
the free disposable income ratio. Finally, variables 15 and 16 measure the total number of
luxury good varieties and the share of new goods in that total, respectively.
The plots in Figures 4.A-6.B cover the same variables in the same order. The first 8 plots
per experiment cover the first 8 variables from Table 4, and the second batch of 8 plots per
experiment cover variables 9-16. 12
Variable BaseRun Exp. 1 Exp. 2 Exp. 5 Exp. 6
1 Psubsloc/PS (%) 14.60 +5.70 -1.20 +0.50 -0.41
2 PsubsN/PS (%) 40.09 -4.23 -1.11 +0.89 +0.24
3 PluxS/PS (%) 45.31 -1.48 +2.32 -1.40 +0.16
4 Npartners 2.30 -8.66 +1.86 +9.86 +0.76
5 profitsNbas 0.24 -33.28 +11.04 +14.47 +1.25
6 profitsNlux 0.30 +1.59 +0.83 +3.19 +8.32
7 profitsNtot 0.54 -14.05 +5.41 +8.25 +5.15
8 profitsNbas/
profitsNtot (%)
44.85 -10.035 +2.40 +2.58 -1.66
9 profitsNtot/
fdispincN (%)
34.84 -3.45 +0.96 +0.80 -0.43
10 fdispincN/
fdispincS
4.14 -26.61 +2.59 -12.54 +6.45
11 ToT (pN/pS) 1.35 +0.46 +1.08 +4.53 -2.59
12 UN 2.14-2.76 -4.86 +1.91 +3.03 +8.22
13 US 0.52-0.68 +29.63 -0.66 +17.81 +1.66
14 UN/US 4.14 -26.61 +2.59 -12.54 +6.45
15 A 5.00-11.79 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00
16 (A-B)/A (%) 80.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00
Table 4. Outcomes by Experiment: % Differences between Steady States
12 Plots are shown from left to right continuing on the next line of plots.
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Results Base Run
The base run results indicate that, for the base run parameterization, subsistence goods
production is an important source of profits for the North. In addition, it is an important
source of employment for the South. It should be noted that there are 2.3 partners in this case,
which is actually larger than the total population of the South. This is because the average
population size of a country equals 0.5, since we have assumed that the density of Southern
countries in each point within the dotted rectangle in Figure 2 equals 1. Hence, the number of
Southern countries is necessarily larger than the Southern population. Because the North
produces a much wider spectrum of luxuries than the South, its free disposable income is
much larger than in the South, also because profits amount to about one third of free
disposable income in the North. The terms of trade are very favorable for the North, and so is
the distribution of utility between the North and the South. Note that in the 10 ‘year’
simulation period, the total number of luxury goods more than doubles. However, the share
of Northern luxury goods in total luxury goods remains constant at 80 percent.
Results Experiment 1: a 10% productivity rise in local subsistence goods productivity
Such a productivity rise lowers Southern prices for subsistence goods q, and therefore
also lowers prices for the basic goods produced by the North. The marginal Southern
countries now yield lower profit, turning them in fact extra-marginal. Consequently the
number of Southern partner countries is reduced by almost 9 percent. This forces those
Southern countries to move their subsistence production labor from Northern subsistence
production technologies into local subsistence technologies, which leads therefore to a fall in
subsistence labour productivity on that account (Northern technology still outperforms the
improved Southern subsistence technology). However, as the local subsistence technology
itself has increased in productivity, the overall productivity effect is positive, leading to more
Southern labor resources being available for luxury goods production, and hence to a (slight)
fall in the terms of trade for the South. Nonetheless, the overall effect on Southern utility is
very positive, because free disposable income for the South rises significantly.13
13 It should be noted that because we have aggregated over partner countries, some of the differential
country  results  go  unnoticed.  For  example,  if  an  extra-marginal  Southern  country  would  become  a
partner country, the real income effect of such a change would be much bigger for a small country than
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Results Experiment 2: a 10% productivity rise in Northern subsistence goods productivity
The results for this experiment. experiment, except for the change in employment in
Northern subsistence technologies. Even though the number of partner countries increases
(because the productivity increase of the Northern technology raises profits on Northern
subsistence goods production, ceteris paribus, turning some of the previously non-partner
countries into partners), the 10 % productivity increase reduces the overall labor
requirements in Northern subsistence goods production. With more partner countries and
higher Northern subsistence goods productivity, there is now ‘spare’ Southern labor that can
be used to increase the production of luxury goods. This however, leads to a deterioration of
the terms of trade for the South to such an extent that total utility actually falls for the South,
albeit only slightly. For the North, the effects are all positive.
Results Experiment 3: a 10 % increase in the rate of innovation in the North
The results of this experiment are shown in Figures 4.A and 4.B below. The results are
very much as expected, as they closely resemble the ones obtained by Krugman: a higher rate
of innovation increases the relative scarcity of Northern luxury goods per variety, and hence
raises the terms of trade, and also Northern wages. This reduces the number of Southern
partner countries, and forces the South to move labor into local subsistence production. The
effect is a lower supply of Southern luxury goods, which limits the rise in the terms of trade
for the North to some extent. Free disposable income for the South falls, but utility for the
South – perhaps somewhat surprisingly – does not. The reason is that utility per dollar spent
has risen through the love of variety effect (further called the ‘LOV-effect’), which is
associated with an expansion of the total number of luxury goods. In this case the LOV-effect
is so strong that it more than compensates the negative effects on utility of the drop in free
disposable income. The conclusion that the overall utility effect is positive both for the North
and the South therefore crucially hinges on the relative strength of the LOV-effect.
for a large country, as in the latter case part of subsistence production still uses old, relatively labour
intensive, local production technology.
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Figure 4.A Experiment 3: Rate of Innovation + 10 %,  Plots I-VIII
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34
Results Experiment 4: a 10% increase in the rate of imitation in the South
Like the increase in the rate of Northern innovation, an increase in the rate with which
the South imitates Northern luxury good varieties leads to out-of-steady state dynamics,
which drive the evolution of all variables.
Compared with the base run, the share of luxury goods produced in the South rises
somewhat over time. As the share of luxury goods produced in the South rises, the volume
produced of each of these goods falls. This, in turn, raises the relative price of old luxury
goods, which represents a terms of trade benefit for the South. With the relative price (and
therefore the profitability) of Northern varieties thus diminished, Northern labor moves from
the production of luxury goods in the North into subsistence goods production in the South.
Utility in the South therefore rises not only because of the initial change in the terms-of-trade,
but also due to an income effect associated with a more intensive use of the more efficient
Northern technology in subsistence good production.
This experiment offers a theoretical explanation for the empirically observed move of
multinationals into subsistence goods in recent years. According to the current experiment,
this move could be the endogenous response of Northern firms to increasing imitation by
Southern firms. Hence, greater involvement of the North in Southern subsistence goods
production does not necessarily arise because the benefits from entering Southern markets
have become greater over time, but because the opportunity costs in terms of luxury good
production foregone have dwindled.
Finally, it should be noted that this development is a net benefit for both North and
South. That is, the North gains despite the loss of some monopolies and the associated rents
and its terms of trade loss. The reason is the higher total volume of old luxury goods
produced, enabled by the more efficient production of subsistence goods, releases labor from
inefficient local production in the South. Because the labor thus released is used in old luxury
goods production, the negative terms of trade effects of increased imitation for the North are
mitigated to such an extent, that both the North and the South may actually gain in utility
terms, albeit only very slightly for the North and in a much more outspoken manner for the
South.
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Results Experiment 5: a 10 % increase of the population in the South
Contrary to expectations perhaps, this has a positive effect on utility both in the North
and in the South, and more so in the South. Utility per head in the South rises by almost 8
percent (17.8 percent rise in total utility less 10 percent rise in the number of heads), even
though the terms of trade go against the South, as expected. The reason is that the number of
Southern partner countries increases by almost 10 percent. Total profits from Northern
subsistence goods production increase considerably, but the North now earns less in actual
Northern luxury goods production, leading to a fall in the free disposable income ratio for the
North and the South. However, for both the North and the South, total utility rises relative to
the base run, which is indicative of a rise in free disposable income in the North and the
South, because in this experiment there is no additional LOV-effect to take into account, as
the rates of imitation and innovation are unaffected. We conclude that an increase in the size
of the population in the South, invokes partnerships reactions by the North that increases
average labor productivity in the South, that in this case outweigh the negative terms of trade
effects for the South.
Results Experiment 6: a 10 % increase of the population in the North
A 10 percent increase in the size of the workforce in the North has negative terms of
trade effects for the North, and decreases Northern wages in the process. This creates an
incentive to move into Southern subsistence goods production and to increase the number of
partners in the South. Total profits for the North increase, but free disposable income for the
North increases by more than that, since the share of profits in free disposable income slightly
falls. In the North, utility per head falls slightly. In the South utility per head rises roughly by
as much as utility per head in the North falls. This is due to the positive terms of trade effect
for the South, but also because average labor productivity in the South has risen somewhat
due to an increased activity of the North in Southern subsistence goods production.
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Results Experiment 7: Decreasing Returns to Variety
In this experiment we make the weight of the marginal variety in the utility function
decay with rate g  as the number of varieties increases due to innovation. Since the North
produces the latest luxury goods varieties, one can interpret this as demand becoming ever
more biased in the direction of Southern varieties, because the newest Northern varieties
contribute less and less to utility. Contrary to the other (non-innovation) experiments, one
sees that the deviations from the base-run have a tendency to grow bigger over time in
absolute terms, except for the innovation and imitation related variables, that exogenously
evolve over time. The reason is that we now have a variable, i.e. the marginal contribution to
utility of the newest luxury good, hat falls continuously over time. This will reduce the
weight of the entire spectrum of Northern luxury goods in total utility, and hence will
continuously reduce the demand for Northern varieties over time.
Comparing the Figures of experiments 3 and 7, one can immediately see that they
present qualitatively opposite results: positive deviations relative to the base run in
experiment 3 correspond with negative deviations in experiment 7, and the other way
around. This is only natural, as in experiment 3 Northern relative supply conditions per
variety became tighter due to the increase in the size of the Northern luxury goods spectrum,
whereas in experiment 7, demand per variety of the Northern goods spectrum now falls.
Consequently, Northern wages fall, and there is an incentive for the North to engage ever
more intensively in Southern subsistence goods production. Both for the North and the
South, the decreasing returns to variety results in lower utility but more so for the North as
the ratio of Northern and Southern utility falls.
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Figure 6.A Experiment 7: Decreasing Returns to Variety, Plots I-VIII
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Figure 6.B Experiment 7: Decreasing Returns to Variety, Plots IX-XVI
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4. Concluding Remarks
In this paper we have presented an extension of Krugman’s (1979) North-South model
by  including  subsistence  goods  production  in  the  South  next  to  matured  luxury  goods
production in the South and ‘new’ luxury goods production in the North. Subsistence goods
can be produced in the South using either a relatively efficient Northern technology that
requires a fixed amount of Northern high-skilled management input, or using less efficient
Southern local technologies. The North therefore produces subsistence goods under
increasing returns to scale. We assume that the profitability of the North in subsistence goods
production depends non-linearly on the cost of reaching the local market. We also assume
that Southern countries differ with respect to both the size of their population and the
internal connectedness of their markets. Under these circumstances, we are able to determine
which set of Southern countries would be profitable partners for the North to engage in
subsistence good production. We distinguish between small partner countries and large
partner countries. Small countries are so small that their entire population is smaller than the
size of the population that would be targeted by a profit maximizing Northern subsistence
goods supplier. Hence, in small countries marginal profit opportunities are left unused. In
large countries, all positive marginal profit opportunities are exhausted at a level of the
targeted population that is below the actual population size of the country. This implies that
it is profitable for a Northern firm to leave part of the local population un-serviced.
We have assumed that the North repatriates the rents arising from those subsistence
goods production activities from the South to the North. For the Southern partners, however,
there is a productivity effect that they can benefit from, in the sense that using the more
efficient Northern subsistence goods production techniques instead of the less efficient local
techniques, frees labor resources that can now be used to produce the tradable ‘old’ luxury
goods. Thus the South has more to trade on the world-market, but suffers a negative terms of
trade effect in the process, in combination with a positive real income effect. Whether the
overall effect on utility is positive, depends on the specific situation on hand, as we show in a
number of parameter sensitivity experiments.
Based on these experiments, we can draw a number of conclusions. The first one is that
the reactions of the model to changes in the rate of innovation work in qualitatively the same
way as in the Krugman (1979) model. A wider spectrum of Northern luxury goods, in
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combination with the existence of latent demand for these goods, increases the scarcity of
each individual Northern variety, and presents a negative terms of trade effect for the South.
However, in this case the situation is even worse for the South, because the rise in Northern
wages that this entails, makes it less worthwhile for the North to engage in subsistence goods
production in the marginal Southern partner countries (the Southern countries currently
yielding zero profits). Thus, the marginal Southern partners become extra-marginal (i.e. non-
partners effectively), and are forced to redirect part of their labour resources into relatively
inefficient subsistence goods production again. This reduces their ability to supply old
tradable luxury goods to the world-market, which represents a real negative (free disposable)
income effect. There is also a countervailing terms of trade effect, that is positive from the
point of view of the South, but the effect is not strong enough so to compensate the negative
income effect.
The second conclusion is that changes in the productivity of the North and of the South
in subsistence goods production work out favorably for the region that owns the technology
whose productivity has increased, but unfavorably for the other region. This suggests that
Northern productivity increases in subsistence goods production may not be the best way to
improve utility in the South. Obviously, if the North and the South would engage in rent-
sharing, the situation might change in favor of Northern productivity increases, but at this
stage we haven’t looked more closely into this matter yet.
The third conclusion is that increases in the rate of innovation unambiguously raise
utility for both parties. However, the number of partner countries for the North decreases,
leading to a fall in average productivity for the South, and hence to lower real free disposable
income, also because there is a negative terms of trade effect from the point of view of the
South.  Nonetheless,  utility for the South rises absolutely,  due to the LOV-effect.  This result,
even though implied by the model structure, seems somewhat hard to believe. As free
disposable income in the South is far lower than in the North, one would expect the LOV-
effect there to be potentially less important than in the North, suggesting a further extension
of the decreasing returns to variety model, by making the marginal contribution coefficient of
each variety in the utility function dependent on free disposable income per head and the
variety index, rather than on the variety index alone. Stated differently, one could imagine
that for countries with a low free disposable income per head, the contribution to utility of
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the newest varieties are lower than for countries with a higher value of income per head. At
this stage, we must leave this for future research, however.
The fourth conclusion is that the move of Western companies into Southern subsistence
goods market may actually be regarded as a natural by-product of the successful imitation
efforts by the South. Our experiment with an increase in the rate of imitation shows that this
reduces the terms of trade for the North and consequently lowers the opportunity cost of
Northern high-skilled workers in terms of the profits on Northern luxury goods production
foregone. In these circumstances, entering Southern subsistence markets becomes a more
profitable business opportunity for the North.
The fifth conclusion is that changes in population sizes in both the North and in the
South provide an incentive for the North to intensify its subsistence goods production in the
South by seeking more Southern subsistence goods production partners. In terms of utility
per head, the South would actually benefit from having a higher population, as that raises the
incentive for the North to increase the number of subsistence production partners in the
South and raise aggregate Southern productivity in the process. By contrast, a rise in the
Northern population leads to a slightly lower rise in Northern utility, and hence to a slight
fall in utility per head. Conversely, a fall in the size of the Northern population would raise
utility per head.
The sixth conclusion is that the satiation of demand for the newest luxury goods, as we
have modeled in experiment 6, leads to a continuously falling terms of trade for the North,
and an increasing incentive for the North to move into Southern subsistence goods
production. This has positive real productivity effects for the South, which, furthermore, is
accompanied by a positive terms of trade effects for the South.
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Appendix A.  Aggregation over Southern Countries
This appendix describes the outcomes of various aggregations over groups of Southern
countries. These aggregations are necessary in order to be able to determine:
1. the total demand for high-skilled labor associated with subsistence goods
production in Southern countries;
2. the demand for low-skilled labor associated with subsistence goods production in
Southern countries;
3. the profit flows associated with subsistence goods production in Southern countries.
In order to be able to do this, the distinction between large and small countries is
important again. For small countries, the population size determines the size of the profitable
subsistence market for Northern firms, whereas this is not the case for large countries. The
same applies therefore to the demand for labor in as far as it is associated with subsistence
goods production. This holds both for high-skilled management labor, as well as low-skilled
production labor. Finally, the net operating surplus depends on the combination of
characteristics of a country. Hence, aggregation over all profits earned by Northern firms in
Southern subsistence markets allows us to obtain the income flows as they arise out of
subsistence goods production.
In order to be able to perform the aggregations mentioned above, it is helpful to present
the three situations that can arise in the model for which the set of partner countries is non-
empty again (see Figure 3 in the main text):
PPP
TQ
M
q
TQ
M
Q
M
q
R
Situation II Situation III Situation IV
ZU V W
q
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We summarize the requirements for each situation in the table below:
P(Q) P(M) P(T)
Situation II P(Q) < P max P (M) < P max P (T) < P
Situation III P(Q) < P max P (M) < P max
Situation IV P(Q) < P max P (M) ³ P max
Recalling that the vertical dotted line and the horizontal dotted line are defined by
maxPP =  and maxqq = , respectively, the number of Southern countries in which Northern
firms are engaged in subsistence production can be obtained as follows. For situation 2, draw
a horizontal line somewhere between points Q and M. This line will intersect with the convex
curve connecting points Q and M at a point further called U, as well as the straight line
connecting points M and T at a point further called V but also the vertical dotted line at a
point further called W. Obviously, the length of the line-segment connecting points U and V,
further called UV, depends on the vertical position of that line-segment, i.e. on q . Hence, the
area associated with the small partner countries is the integral over all line-segments UV with
a q  in the interval )()..( QM qq . Thus, for the number of small Southern partner countries in
situation II, we would find that:
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where 1 is the frequency of Southern countries in each point of the area enclosed by the
vertical and horizontal dotted lines, as before. For the number of large partner countries, we
would find analogously:
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Note that for situations III and IV, a similar procedure can be followed, but the
integration boundaries need to be adjusted somewhat. This is straightforward and therefore
not shown here.
As regards the supply of labour available for matured luxury goods production, we
need to distinguish again between large and small countries. For a small country, for
example, and using the assumption that vS<1, we must have that the total amount of low-
skilled labour not used in subsistence goods production is equal to:
P NS = P - vN × P *-v S × (P - P*) = P × (1- v S ) + (v S - vN ) × P * (A.3)
Equation (A.3) has several interesting features. First, if vS>vN as we assume, then
Northern subsistence goods production in a Southern country does indeed free resources that
become available for matured luxury goods production. Secondly, the larger the Northern
subsistence goods market P*, the more resources will be freed. Finally, lowering v S  will help
free resources only in case the Southern country is big, since for small countries we have that
P* = P  if 1<Sv , as we have assumed it to be the case and (A.3) reduces to:
)1( NNS vPP -×= (A.4)
Equation (A.4) reflects the notion that all subsistence goods production in a small
Southern country is taken over by Northern producers, by the definition of a small country.
Hence, in situation 2, we would find that the total supply of low-skilled labour in small
Southern countries, i.e. LS, that is available for matured luxury good production must in that
case be given by:
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For a large country, (A.4) does not hold. Instead, we would have to substitute the
definition of S* from Table 1 into (A.3) , in which case we would find for low-skilled labour
supply in large Southern countries, i.e. LL , that:
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Finally, total profits from subsistence goods production can be obtained as follows. The
net operating surplus per active firm in each country will be given by equation (8), where one
should realize that the net operating surplus, i.e. g , is a function of q  for large countries and
of q  and P  for small countries, as apparent from Table 1. Thus we get for total profits
obtained from subsistence goods production in small Southern countries, i.e. SP :
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For large Southern countries we obtain, by analogy:
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Using the principles outlined above, we first have to obtain the expressions for the
points U,V and W, before we can actually evaluate all the integrals. Since these expressions
are relatively complicated for the small country case, the integrals themselves become
relatively unintelligible. Hence we do not report them here. For the simulations we have
performed, we have evaluated these integrals numerically as part of the numerical simulation
of the entire model, using the Mathematica  programming package.
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